ALECOMM

The disputes involve both maritime boundaries and islands.^[10] There are several disputes, each of which involves a different collection of countries:

1. The nine-dash line area claimed by the Republic of China, later the People's Republic of China (PRC), which covers most of the South China Sea and overlaps with the exclusive economic zone claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
2. Maritime boundary along the Vietnamese coast between the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
3. Maritime boundary north of Borneobetween the PRC, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, and Taiwan.
4. Islands, reefs, banks and shoals in the South China Sea, including the Paracel Islands, the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands between the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and parts of the area also contested by Malaysia and the Philippines.
5. Maritime boundary in the waters north of the Natuna Islands between the PRC, Indonesia and Taiwan^[11]
6. Maritime boundary off the coast of Palawan and Luzon between the PRC, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
7. Maritime boundary, land territory, and the islands of Sabah, including Ambalat, between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
8. Maritime boundary and islands in the Luzon Strait between the PRC, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

South-east facing aerial view of PRC-settled Woody Island. The island is also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam.

During World War II, the Empire of Japan used the islands in the South China Sea region for various military purposes and asserted that the islands were not claimed by anyone when the Imperial Japanese Navy took control of them.^[12][13] Historical accounts note that at least France had controlled some of the features in the region during the 1930s.^[14]After the war, Imperial Japan had to relinquish control of the islands in the South China Sea in the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco which, however, did not specify the new status of the islands.^[15] The People's Republic of China made various claims to the islands during the 1951 treaty negotiations and the 1958 First Taiwan Strait Crisis.^[16]

Chinese claims in the South China sea are delineated in part by the nine-dash line. This was originally an "eleven-dashed-line," first indicated by the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947, for its claims to the South China Sea. When the Communist Party of China took over mainland China and formed the People's Republic of China in 1949, the line was adopted and revised to nine dashes/dots, as endorsed by Zhou Enlai.^[17]China's 1958 declaration described China's claims in the South China Sea islands based on the nine-dotted line map.^[18] The legacy of the nine-dash line is viewed by some PRC government officials, and by the PRC military, as providing historical support for their claims to the South China Sea.^[19]

The Geneva Accords of 1954,^[20] which ended the First Indochina War, gave South Vietnamcontrol of the Vietnamese territories south of the 17th Parallel, which included the islands in the Paracels and Spratlys.^[21] Two years later the North Vietnamese government claimed that the People's Republic of China is the lawful claimant of the islands, while South Vietnam took control of the Paracel Islands.^[21]

In 1974, when a North Vietnamese victory in the Vietnam War began to seem probable, the PRC used military force in the Paracel Islandsand took Yagong Island and the Crescent group of reefs from South Vietnam.^[14][22] The government of the PRC wanted to prevent the Paracel islands from falling under the control of North Vietnam, which at the time was an ally of the Soviet Union. The PRC had fought a brief border war with the Soviet Union in 1969 and did not want to have a Soviet presence near its coast, which is why China resorted to "counterattack in self-defense".^[22] The United States, in the middle of détente with the PRC, gave a non-involvement promise to the PRC, which enabled the People's Liberation Army Navy to take control of the South Vietnamese islands.^[23]

In the later half of 1970s, the Philippines and Malaysia began referring to the Spratly Islands as included in their own territory.^[24] On 11 June 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines issued Presidential decree No. 1596, declaring the north-western part of the Spratly Islands (referred to therein as the Kalayaan Island Group) as Philippine territory.^[24]

In 1988, PRC and Vietnam fought each othernear the Johnson Reef.^[25] The PRC had obtained a permit from the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission to build five observation posts for the conduction of ocean surveys, and one of the permitted observation posts was allowed to be located in the Spratly islands region.^[26] The PRC chose to built its observation post on the Fiery Cross Reef, which was isolated from the other islands in the region and was not occupied by any state at the time. When it started to build the observation post in the terra nullius Fiery Cross Reef, Vietnam sent its navy to the area to monitor the situation.^[27] The two states clashed near the Johnson Reef, and after the clash, China occupied the Johnson Reef.^[26]

Fiery Cross Reef being transformed by the PRC in May 2015

In 1994, the PRC occupied Mischief Reef, located some 250 miles from the Philippine coast. Occupation was made in the middle of an energy resources race in the Spratlys, where China lacked a presence while the other countries were starting their oil exploration businesses.^[27] Mischief Reef marked the first time when the PRC had a military confrontation with the Philippines,^[28] an ally of the United States.

The occupation and/or control of most parts of the Spratly and Paracel islands has not changed significantly since the middle of 1990s.^{[29][circular reference]} The PRC controls all of the features in the Paracels. In the Spratlys, Vietnam controls the greatest number (29) of features, while the Philippines has control of eight features, Malaysia five, the PRC five, and the Republic of China one. Balance of power in the Spratlys has greatly shifted since 2013, when the PRC started its island building activities in the region.^[4]

In 2012, the PRC took the Scarborough Shoalas a response to the Philippine navy's actions of stopping Chinese fishing boats in the area.^[30][31]

2011 agreementEdit

On 20 July 2011, the PRC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam agreed a set of preliminary guidelines on the implementation of the DOC (Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea) which would help resolve disputes.^[32] The agreement was described by the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, as "an important milestone document for cooperation among China and ASEAN countries".^[32] Some of the early drafts acknowledged aspects such as "marine environmental protection, scientific research, safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue and combating transnational crime", although the issue of oil and natural gas drilling remains unresolved. "Following the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), China and ASEAN countries actively advanced the consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea,"^[33] with the forecast that the COC will be completed by 2021.^[34]

Chinese objection to Indian naval presence and oil explorationEdit

On 22 July 2011, the INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault vessel on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China Sea by a party identifying itself as the PLA Navy and stating that the ship was entering PRC waters.^[35][36]A spokesperson for the Indian Navy explained that as no ship or aircraft was visible, the INS Airavat proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all."^[35]

In September 2011, shortly after the PRC and Vietnam signed an agreement seeking to contain a dispute over the South China Sea, India's state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) said that its overseas investment arm, ONGC Videsh Limited, had signed a three-year agreement with PetroVietnam for developing long-term co-operation in the oil sector, and that it had accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea.^[37] In response, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, without referring to India by name, stated:

"China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the island. China's stand is based on historical facts and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed in the course of history and this position has been held by Chinese Government for long. On the basis of this China is ready to engage in peaceful negotiations and friendly consultations to peacefully solve the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights so as to positively contribute to peace and tranquillity in the South China Sea area. We hope that the relevant countries respect China's position and refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue. We hope they will respect and support countries in the region to solve the bilateral disputes through bilateral channels. As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute."^[38][39]

An Indian foreign ministry spokesman responded, "The Chinese had concerns, but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and we have conveyed this to the Chinese."^[38] The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times.^[37][39]

Chinese policy on the South China SeaEdit

In Spring 2010, PRC officials reportedly communicated to US officials that the South China Sea was "an area of 'core interest' that is as non-negotiable" and on par with Taiwan and Tibet on the national agenda. However, Beijing appears to have backed away from that assertion in 2011.^[40][41][42]

In October 2011, the PRC's Global Timesnewspaper, published by the Communist PartyPeople's Daily group, editorialised on South China Sea territorial disputes under the banner "Don't take peaceful approach for granted". The article referenced incidents earlier that year involving the Philippines and South Korea detaining PRC fishing boats in the region. "If these countries don't want to change their ways with China, they will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved."^[43]Responding to questions about whether this reflected official policy, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated the country's commitment "to resolving the maritime dispute through peaceful means."^[44]

In July 2014, Professor Alan Dupont of the University of New South Wales was reported as saying that the Chinese government appeared to be directing its fishing fleet into disputed waters as a matter of policy.^[45]

In August 2019, China's President Xi Jinpingtold the Philippines' President Rodrigo Dutertethat China would not recognise or abide by the Arbitration decision. This occurred during a visit by Duterte to Beijing, with discussions between the two leaders.^[46] Such a stance by Beijing is in line with the July 2019 publishing of a Chinese White Paper, "China's National Defense in the New Era," which details China's armed strength and repeatedly mentions deployment in the South China Sea.^[47]

Oil developmentEdit

The area is said to be rich in oil and natural gas deposits; however, the estimates are highly varied. The Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining of the People's Republic of Chinaestimated that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion tons of crude oil,^[48]whereas the oil rich country of Kuwait has 13 billion tons. In the years following the announcement by the PRC ministry, the claims regarding the South China Sea islands intensified. However, other sources claim that the proven reserves of oil in the South China Sea may only be 7.5 billion barrels, or about 1.1 billion tons.^[49] According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s profile of the South China Sea region, a US Geological Survey estimate puts the region's discovered and undiscovered oil reserves at 11 billion barrels, as opposed to a PRC figure of 125 billion barrels.^[50] The same EIA report also points to the wide variety of natural gas resource estimations, ranging from 190 trillion cubic feet to 500 trillion cubic feet, likely located in the contested Reed Bank".^[50]

The South China Sea is dubbed by the PRC as the "second Persian Sea."^[51] The state-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to spend 200 billion RMB (US$30 billion) in the next 20 years to exploit oil in the region, with the estimated production of 25 million metric tons of crude oil and natural gas per annum, at a depth of 2000 meters within the next five years.^[52]

The Philippines began exploring the areas west of Palawan for oil in 1970. Exploration in the area began in Reed Bank/Tablemount.^[53] In 1976, gas was discovered following the drilling of a well.^[54] However, the PRC's complaints halted the exploration.^{[citation needed]} On 27 March 1984, the first Philippine oil company discovered an oil field off Palawan, which is an island province bordering the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea.^[55] These oil fields supply 15% of annual oil consumption in the Philippines.^{[citation needed]}

Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement early in 1978 on the development of oil in the South China Sea.^{[citation needed]} By 2012 Vietnam had concluded some 60 oil and gas exploration and production contracts with various foreign companies.^[56] In 1986, the "White Tiger" oil field in the South China Sea came into operation, producing over 2,000 tons of crude oil per year, followed by "The Bear" and "Dragon" oil fields.^[57] Offshore exploration activities in 2011 increased Vietnam's proven oil reserves to be the third largest in the Asia-Pacific region.^[58] However, the country is a net importer of oil products.^[59]In 2009 petroleum accounted for 14 percent of Vietnamese government income, down from 24 percent in 2004.^[60]

China's first independently designed and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China Sea is the Ocean Oil 981 (海洋石油981). The major shareholders are J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (19%), Commonwealth Bank of Australia(14%), T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and affiliates (6%), and BlackRock, Inc. (5%).^[61] It began operation on 9 May 2012 in the South China Sea, 320 kilometres (200 mi) southeast of Hong Kong, at a depth of 1,500 m and employing 160 people.^[62] On 2 May 2014 the platform was moved near to the Paracel Islands,^[63] a move Vietnam stated violated their territorial claims.^[64] Chinese officials said it was legal, stating the area lies in waters surrounding the Paracel Islands which China occupies and militarily controls.^[65]

Competing claims in the oil and gas-rich South China Sea have stifled the development and exploitation of these resources. To break from this, the Philippines and China agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development in November 2018, where joint-use of, and not ownership over assets underlies the agreement. In the past, aggressive Chinese naval patrols deterred Manila from exploring gas deposits in disputed waters, like the Reed Bank, such that this type of agreement may allow for the claimant states to jointly develop the natural gas in the offshore area. The mechanism of joint agreements is not new, with Malaysia and Vietnam having forged a similar mechanism in 1992, while Malaysia and Thailand reached understandings in 1979 and 1990 over the development of gas-rich disputed waters.^[66]

Incidents involving fishermenEdit

Prior to the dispute, fishermen from involved countries tended to enter each other's controlled islands and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) leading to conflicts with the authorities that controlled the areas as they were unaware of the exact borders. As well, due to depletion of the fishing resources in their maritime areas, they were forced to fish in the neighbouring countries' areas.^[67][68][69]

A Taiwanese fisherman was machine gunned to death by the coast guard of the Philippines in May 2013.^[70][71]

In the spring of 2014, China and Vietnam clashed again over China's Haiyang Shiyou oil rig in Vietnam's EEZ. The incident left seventeen Vietnamese injured and damaged both China's and Vietnam's ships.^[72]

Although Indonesia is not part of claims in the South China Sea dispute, after Joko Widodobecame President of the country in 2014, he instituted a policy in 2015 that, if any foreign fishermen were caught illegally fishing in Indonesian waters, their vessels would be destroyed. The president wanted to make maritime resources, especially fisheries, a key component of his administration's economic policy.^[73][74] Since the policy's initiation, fishing vessels drawing from many neighbouring countries were destroyed by Indonesian authorities. On 21 May 2015, around 41 fishing vessels from China, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines were destroyed.^[75] On 19 March 2016, the China Coast Guard prevented the detention of Chinese fishermen by Indonesian authorities after Chinese fishermen were caught fishing near the waters around Natuna, leading to a protest by Indonesian authorities; the Chinese ambassador was subsequently summonsed as China had considered the areas to be "Chinese traditional fishing grounds".^[76][77] Further Indonesian campaigns against foreign fishermen resulted in the destruction of 23 fishing boats from Malaysia and Vietnam on 5 April 2016.^[78]

Until late 2016, most fishing vessels blown up by Indonesian authorities were Vietnamese fishing vessels.^[79][80] Although Indonesian authorities increased their patrols to detect foreign fishing vessels, the areas in the South China Sea had already become known for Indonesian pirates, with frequent attacks on Malaysian, Singaporean and Vietnamese vessels as well as leading to hijacking such as the MT Orkim Harmony and MT Zafirah hijacking incidents. The continuing war against foreign fishermen by Indonesia led to protests by Vietnam in late 2016, when a Vietnamese fisherman was killed after being shot by Indonesian authorities.^[68][69] Beside that, Filipino pirates of Moro Pirates from the Sulu Sea also reaching South China Sea when a Vietnamese fisherman was killed by Filipino pirates in late 2015.^[81]

The Shangri-La Dialogue serves as the "Track One" exchange forum on security issues surrounding the Asia-Pacific region. The South China Sea territorial disputes has dominated proceedings at the conference in recent years.^[82][83][84] The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific is the "Track Two" forum for dialogue on security issues.^[85][86]

In February 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama initiated the US-ASEAN Summit at Sunnylands in Rancho Mirage, California for closer engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea were a major topic, but its joint statement, the "Sunnylands Declaration", did not name the South China Sea, instead calling for "respect of each nation's sovereignty and for international law". Analysts believe it indicates divisions within the group on how to respond to China's maritime strategy.^[87][88]

Independent analysisEdit

The vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China's claims based on historical claims are invalid.^[89]

The position of China on its maritime claims based on UNCLOS and history has been ambiguous, particularly with the nine dash line map.^[90][91] For example, in its notes verbalesin 2011, the first phrase stated that China has undisputed sovereignty over the islands and the adjacent waters, suggesting China is claiming sovereignty over its territorial waters, a position consistent with UNCLOS.^[90]However, the second phrase in its notes verbales stated that China enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters along with the seabed and subsoil contained in this region, suggesting that China is claiming sovereignty over all of the maritime space (includes all the geographic features and the waters within the nine dash line).^[90] The third phrase indicates support for basing their claims on historical basis as well.^[90] Recently in its notes verbales in 2011, China has explicitly stated that it claims the territorial waters and all of the islands in which each island has its own exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.^[91] A major problem with this claim is that it fails to distinguish between geographic features considered as "islands" or "rocks" under UNCLOS.^[91]

Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji criticised Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for trying to falsely portray China as a threat to Japan and that China was invading neighbours such as the Philippines. He pointed out that the Spratly Islands were not part of the Philippines when the US acquired the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris in 1898 and that Japanese-ruled Taiwan itself had annexed the Spratly Islands in 1938 in a move that was never challenged by the US-ruled Philippines, which never asserted that it was their territory. He also pointed out that other countries did not need to do full land reclamation since they already controlled islands and that the reason China engaged in extensive land reclamation is because they needed it to build airfields since China only has control over reefs.^[92]

JapanEdit

Japan has used "normative power" via strategic foreign aid to certain claimants in the dispute such as the Philippines and Vietnam in order to assert its presence in the region as promoting the "rule of law at sea."^[93]

CambodiaEdit

Cambodia has backed China over the dispute in ASEAN meetings, preventing consensus over unified ASEAN action.^[94] Anti-Vietnamese sentiment due to Vietnam's conquest of previously Cambodian lands, giving the Vietnamese a privileged status and encouragement of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia during French colonial rule, and the occupation of Cambodia after the ouster of the Khmer Rouge has led to anti-Vietnamese feelings against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and against Vietnam, and in turn has led to pro-China sentiment among the Cambodian government and the Cambodian opposition, including in the South China Sea.^[95]

East TimorEdit

The sweeping maritime claims of gas and oil rich territory maintained and disputed by Australia against the tiny country of East Timorand flouting of international law have been compared to the situation in the South China Sea, causing the East Timorese government to deprecate China's claims and stance.^[96]

IndonesiaEdit

Since early in the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia has repeatedly asserted its position as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute,^[97] and often positioned itself as an "honest broker".^[98] However, parts of China's unilaterally claimed nine-dash line overlap Indonesia's exclusive economic zone near the Natuna islands. Although China has acknowledged Indonesia's sovereignty over the Natuna islands,^[99] the PRC has argued that the waters around the Natuna islands are Chinese "traditional fishing grounds". Indonesia quickly dismissed China's claim, asserting that China's nine-dash line claim over parts of the Natuna islands has no legal basis.^[100] In November 2015, Indonesia's security chief Luhut Panjaitan said Indonesia could take China before an international court.^[101]Indonesia filed a comment with the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding China's claim in the case of Philippines v. China.

Chinese fishing vessels – often escorted by Chinese coastguard ships – have repeatedly been reported to have breached Indonesian waters near the Natuna islands. On 19 March 2016, for example, Indonesian authorities tried to capture a Chinese trawler accused of illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, and arrested the Chinese crew. They were prevented from towing the boat to harbour by a Chinese coast guard vessel which reportedly "rammed" the trawler in Indonesian waters. "To prevent anything else occurring, the Indonesian authorities let go of the Chinese boat and then left toward Natuna, still with eight fishermen and the captain on board," said Arrmanatha Nasir, a spokesman for Indonesia's Foreign Ministry. Indonesia still has the Chinese crew in custody.^[102] On 21 March 2016, minister for fisheries and maritime affairs Susi Pudjiastutisummoned the Chinese ambassador, Xie Feng, and discussed this matter.^[102] Indonesia insists that they have the right to prosecute the Chinese trawler crew, despite Beijing's demand to release their eight fishermen. Arif Havas Oegroseno, the government official of maritime security, said that the Chinese claim of "traditional fishing grounds" was not recognised under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This incident prompted security minister Luhut Pandjaitan to deploy more troops and patrol boats, and to strengthen the Ranai naval base in the area.^[103]

Following the clashes, on 23 June 2016, Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited the Natuna islands on a warship to demonstrate Indonesia's authority. He led a high-level delegation, which included the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and state ministers. Security Minister Luhut Panjaitan said it was meant to send a "clear message" that Indonesia was "very serious in its effort to protect its sovereignty".^[104]

Following the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on 12 July 2016, Indonesia called on all parties involved in the territorial dispute to exercise self-restraint and to respect applicable international laws.^[105]

Indonesia challenged the Chinese nine-dash historical claim by arguing that if the historical claims can be used on presenting the territorial naval claims, Indonesia might also use its historical claims on the South China Sea by referring to the ancient influence of the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires.^[106]

KRI Sutedi Senoputra 378 (background), KRI Tjiptadi 381 (centre), and KRI Teuku Umar 385 (foreground). These ships are currently stationed on Natuna Regency to protect Indonesian territory, and EEZ.

Indonesia's EEZ extends 200 nautical miles (370 km) from its shores, which around Natuna means it is slightly intersected by China's Nine-Dash Line, defining its widely disputed claim to most of the South China Sea. In 2014–2015, the presence of the Indonesian National Armed Forces on the islands was reinforced, which the Indonesian government hoped would reduce the chance of any conflict.^[107] Then in early 2020, a further 600 troops were deployed and eight navy warships from the Indonesian Navy including Ahmad Yani-classfrigates, Bung Tomo-class corvettes, and Kapitan Pattimura-class ASW corvettes were sent to the area with support from the Indonesian Navy Naval Aviation CN-235 MPA, the Indonesian Air Force also sent 4 F-16 and a Boeing 737-2x9 Surveillance, and put BAEHawk aircraft nearby on alert after Chinese fishing vessels increased illegal activity within the EEZ, escorted by a Chinese Coast Guardvessel. A recent visit to the area by President Joko Widodo displayed Indonesia's resolve to not overlook such incursions.^[108]

LaosEdit

Laos has supported China by refusing to accept the Permanent Court of Arbitrationruling on China's sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.^[109]

SingaporeEdit

Singapore has reiterated that it is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute and has offered to play a neutral role in being a constructive conduit for dialogue among the claimant states. However, Singapore hopes that China will obey international laws.^[110]

ThailandEdit

Thailand as one of the member of ASEANplayed a coordinating role in facilitating China and ASEAN members involved in the dispute in hope of reaching peaceful resolution. Despite its domestic political turmoil, the Thai government relied on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs' expertise on international dispute. It took the initiative to hold several meetings with parties concerned. Thailand's first attempt was hosting the ASEAN–China Senior Officials' Meeting Retreat in Pattaya, Thailand 2012. Via this meeting, Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister called for a joint development of resources in South China Sea. Bangkok was viewed as an South China Sea neutral player because it is not a claimant and did not have disputes in the South China Sea with China. After several meetings, the 6th ASEAN–China SOM on DOC was the first official consultation on the Code of Conduct (COC) was formed with all parties agreement to push forward the drafting of COC. Thai-China relationship was generally seen as positive. Thailand's neutral position enabled it to act as a mediator and influence discussions among parties involved.^[111]

United StatesEdit

In 1974, the PRC got a non-involvement promise from the United States when it occupied the Yagong Island and the Crescent Group from the South Vietnam.^[23] The United States officially addressed the South China Sea dispute for the first time in 1995, when its statement focused on the peaceful resolution of disputes, peace and stability, freedom of navigation, neutrality over the question of sovereignty and respect of maritime norms.^[112]The 1995 statement did not name any states by their names.

The 1995 policy was changed in 2010, when the administration of the President Obama felt that even though the United States cannot take sides in the dispute, it still has to make a statement that it is not passively accepting the assertive actions taken in the region.^[113] At the July 2010 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech on resolving the disputes in the region without coercion and unequivocally stating that the South China Sea was a matter of U.S. national interest.^[114][115] Her comments were countered by China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as "in effect an attack on China," who warned the United States against making the South China Sea an international issue or multilateral issue.^[116]

In 2012, the United States State Department press statement identified the PRC as an assertive state in the region and communicated the United States worries about the developments in the area.^[117] Also in 2012, Secretary Clinton testified in support of congressional approval of the Law of the Sea Convention, which would strengthen U.S. ability to support countries that oppose Chinese claims to certain islands in the area.^[118] On 29 May 2012, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed concern over this development, stating that "non-claimant Association of South East Asian Nations countries and countries outside the region have adopted a position of not getting involved into territorial disputes."^[119] In July 2012, the United States Senate passed resolution 524, initially sponsored by Senator John Kerry, stating (among other things) the United States' strong support for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, reaffirms the United States' commitment to assist the nations of Southeast Asia to remain strong and independent, and supports enhanced operations by the United States armed forces in the Western Pacific.^[120]

In 2014, the United States responded to China's claims over the fishing grounds of other nations by saying that "China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law for these extensive maritime claims."^[121] USN CNO Jonathan Greenert then pledged American support to the Philippines in its territorial conflicts with the PRC.^[122] The Chinese Foreign Ministry asked the United States to maintain a neutral position on the issue.^[123] In 2014 and 2015, the United States continued freedom of navigation operations, including in the South China Sea.^[124] Sources closer to the Pentagon have also said that the US administration is planning to deploy some more naval assets within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands. In response to this announcement, Beijing issued a strict warning and said that she would not allow any country to violate China's territorial waters in the name of "Freedom of Navigation".^[125] In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter warned China to halt its rapid island-building.^[126] On 27 October 2015, the US destroyer USS Lassennavigated within 12 nautical miles of reclaimed land in the Subi Reef as the first in a series of "Freedom of Navigation Operations".^[127] This is the first time since 2012 that the US has directly challenged China's claims of the island's territorial limit.^[128] On 8–9 November 2015, two US B-52 strategic bombers flew near artificial Chinese-built islands in the area of the Spratly Islands and were contacted by Chinese ground controllers but continued their mission undeterred.^[129]

President Trump's administration has increased the freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea region as a part of their dynamic force employment strategy.^[130] The new U.S. strategy is to be unpredictable and deploy ships to the area without notice.^[131] As of May 2019, the United States has conducted four freedom of navigation operations in the Spratlys during the early 2019.^[130] In 2019, the United States has also twice flown B-52 Stratofortress bombers near the PRC-claimed islands in the Spratlys.^[132] 

• East China Sea EEZ disputes
• First island chain
• Great wall of sand
• Philippines v. China
• Scarborough Shoal standoff
• Spratly Islands dispute

Citations

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• Website of the Chinese National Institute for South China Sea Studies
• Website of the Vietnamese Program for South China Sea Studies Chương trình nghiên cứu Biển Đông (in Vietnamese)